By Arthur Wassenberg
This ebook isn't just approximately company options and stratagems: it really is concerning the 'Faustian' pact among actual and fiscal powers, ruled through the principles of 'minimizing the prices to oneself of enforcing losses upon others'. it's greater than approximately restricted rationality and irrationality: it truly is approximately limitless rationalisations and constrained responsibility.
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Extra resources for Capitalist Discipline: On the orchestration of Corporate Games
Nor is there a competition trap since unitary, rational lonesome wolves have perfect foresight through prompt punch-and-counterpunch responses. Nothing lasts since everything happens stante pede. That is, in the instantaneity of hypercompetition there are neither anticipation nor feedback costs, for a simple reason: timing drives out time in a world thriving on speed and surprise only. Subscribers to this kill- or-be-killed scenario live in a world apparently untouched by the lessons learned on the questionability of the under-socialized conception of “economic man” in neo- classical economics and the over-rationalistic conception of “efficient man” in the The New Industrial State Revisited 33 (admittedly somewhat less unworldly) world of institutional economics.
Understanding the micrologic of intra- and interfirm behavior enhances our understanding of the chances of public–private intermediation at higher levels of interest aggregation against wider time spans of accountability. 1 (3) Inter-actor differences in TIME SPAN OF FEEDBACK Maneuverability and the time span of accountability is that public and private objectives, however rationally conceived, will have the impact that its subscribers profess to be aiming at. Let’s look from this perspective at the theory and practice of coordination in European industrial policy-making.
Where the efficiency drive inspires to size combined with mass production, and the latter to the introduction of large scale technology, it is technology that in turn asks for the domestication of external resource dependences. Summarizing the causal chain, it is the search for efficiency that generates the quest for control and it is control that transforms the game of competing-for- competence into the game of competing-for- dominance. Earlier and subsequent studies (Piettre, 1955; Chamberlain, 1962; Shonfield, 1969; Jacquemin, 1977; Chandler, 1984; De Jong, 1992) can be seen as preludes and variations on the thesis that competitive pressures foster collusion and centralization, the more so when switching and anticipation costs appear to be high (as in capital- and technologyintensive industries).